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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines the challenge of implicit communication -- qualitative statements, tone, and 
non-verbal cues -- to the effectiveness of enforcing corporate disclosure regulation. We use a 
Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) setting, given that the SEC adopted the regulation 
recognizing that managers can convey non-public information privately not just through explicit 
quantitative disclosures but also through implicit communication. In a high-profile enforcement 
action, however, the court focused on a literal examination of the manager’s language rather than 
his positive spin to conclude that the SEC had been “too demanding” in examining the manager’s 
statements and that its enforcement policy was “overly aggressive.” We provide empirical 
evidence suggesting that selective disclosure from managers to financial analysts increased 
significantly after the court’s ruling. We also report survey responses from 60 securities lawyers 
with Reg FD expertise which support the proposition that this increase in disclosure is more likely 
due to an increase in implicit communication than in explicit communication or any other reason. 
Our results highlight the challenges associated with enforcing corporate disclosure regulation in 
the context of implicit communication. 
 
 
For helpful comments, we thank Sudipta Basu, Bill Cready, Rebecca Files, Jere Francis, Jagan Krishnan, Jayanthi 
Krishnan, Inder Khurana, Ningzhong Li, Raynolde Pereira, Elaine Mauldin, Suresh Radhakrishnan, Gil Sadka, Amy 
Zang, Jieying Zhang, and Yuan Zhang and workshop participants at the University of Texas at Dallas, University of 
Missouri – Columbia, Temple University, and HKUST. All errors are our own. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3664289
 
 
1 
 
Implicit Communication and Enforcement of Corporate Disclosure Regulation  
 
“The SEC has scrutinized at an extremely heightened level, every particular word used in the 
statement, including the tense of verbs and the general syntax of each sentence…. Such an 
approach places an unreasonable burden on a company's management and spokespersons to 
become linguistic experts, or otherwise live in fear of violating Regulation FD.” (U.S. District 
Court’s Ruling in SEC v. Siebel Systems, Inc.) 
 
1. Introduction 
Although disclosure regulation and enforcement focus primarily on explicit quantitative 
disclosures, corporations and corporate officials also make extensive use of implicit 
communication -- qualitative information, tone, and non-verbal cues. Several recent studies show 
that implicit communication can convey significant market-sensitive information (see, e.g.,  
Feldman, Govindaraj, Livnat, and Segal 2010; Loughran and McDonald 2011; Mayew and 
Venkatachalam 2012a, 2012b; Blankespoor, Hendricks, and Miller 2017). These findings 
underscore the importance of examining issues associated with enforcing corporate disclosure 
regulations when information is communicated in an implicit manner.  
Although these prior studies demonstrated that implicit communication is a component of 
corporate officials’ public statements and securities filings, implicit communication is potentially 
more significant in the context of private meetings in which there are only a select few market 
participants and non-scripted portions are more likely, providing private meeting attendees a better 
opportunity to observe not just what is said, but how it is said (Durney 2020; Solomon and Soltes 
2015; Soltes 2014). The scope of potential liability exposure that corporate officials face for such 
private communication has a critical effect on the effectiveness of corporate disclosure regulations. 
Using a unique federal court case as our empirical setting, we examine this issue in the context of 
Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD), which prohibits all publicly traded companies from 
disclosing material non-public information to a select few investors. 
Reg FD provides an appropriate empirical setting for the purpose of our study since, at the 
time of the adoption of the regulation, the SEC was firmly of the view that managers could violate 
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Reg FD not just by what they say but also by how they say it (see, e.g., SEC 1999a, 2000; Fisch 
2013). In fact, soon after the adoption of Reg FD in 2000, Richard Walker, Director of the SEC 
Division of Enforcement explained the SEC’s position that implicit communication in private 
meetings can violate Reg FD, stating “selective disclosure of earnings information cannot come in 
the form of indirect guidance, the meaning of which is apparent though implied.” (Walker 2000, 
emphasize added). Subsequently the SEC brought two enforcement actions against firms that it 
believed selectively disclosed non-public information through implicit communication.1 In 2002, 
the SEC penalized Siebel Systems, Inc. and its CEO for selectively disclosing material non-public 
information using positive statements.2 Later in 2003, in an enforcement action against Schering-
Plough, the SEC proceeded against the company and its officials for selectively disclosing material 
non-public information through “a combination of spoken language, tone, emphasis, and 
demeanor.”3 Notably, these early actions were resolved through settlement, so they did not involve 
judicial evaluations of the conduct at issue.  
The SEC’s approach to addressing selective disclosure made through implicit 
communication was challenged, however, when in 2005 the U.S. Federal District Court for the 
Southern District of New York dismissed a civil lawsuit brought by the SEC in 2004 against Siebel 
Systems, Inc. for violation of Reg FD by its officials.4 The SEC alleged that the CFO Kenneth 
Goldman selectively disclosed material non-public information by using positive statements and 
tone in private investor meetings. The SEC noted that prior to the meetings, the company publicly 
provided a negative outlook about the company’s business activity, whereas, at the meetings, 
Goldman provided an optimistic outlook, which materially contrasted with the negative tone of 
                                               
1 Consistent with the terminology used in the final release of Reg FD (SEC 2000), we use the term selective disclosure 
to refer to communication of non-public material information to a select few. 
2 Securities and Exchange Commission v. Siebel Systems, Inc., Litigation Release No. 17860 (Nov. 25, 2002). 
3 Schering-Plough Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 48,461, Admin. Proceeding File No. 3-11,249 (Sept. 9, 2003). 
4 SEC v. Siebel Sys., Inc., 384 F. Supp. 2d 694 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
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the company’s public disclosures. The attendees promptly purchased the company’s stock, its 
trading volume doubled the next day, and its price increased by 8%.5  
However, on September 1, 2005, the court held that the SEC had been too demanding. The 
court focused on a close reading of the text of the official’s statements rather than the official’s 
tone to conclude that his private disclosures were “equivalent in substance to the information 
publicly disclosed [by the company].”6 Explaining that “The regulation does not prohibit persons 
speaking on behalf of an issuer, from providing mere positive or negative characterizations, or 
their optimistic or pessimistic subjective general impressions, based upon or drawn from the 
material information available to the public,” the court concluded that Reg FD required a material 
difference between the company’s public statements and those made in the private meetings, and 
that there was no material difference in the case before it. 7  
The court’s ruling in Siebel Systems revealed the difficulty associated with enforcing 
corporate disclosure regulations in the context of implicit communication, and created a substantial 
burden for enforcing Reg FD for disclosures made in private meetings through characterizations, 
tone, or demeanor. The court observed that the SEC’s “approach places an unreasonable burden 
on a company's management and spokespersons to become linguistic experts, or otherwise live in 
fear of violating Regulation FD.” The ruling also signaled to the market participants that even a 
significant stock price reaction or trading activity by select investors following a private meeting 
need not constitute proof that management intentionaly disclosed material non-public information 
in an implicit manner.  
We posit that the Siebel decision signaled to market participants the regulation’s 
ineffectiveness as a tool for policing implicit communication and, in this study, we examine its 
                                               
5 Figures 1 and 2 present Siebel’s stock price reaction and trading volume around the date of the private meetings. 
Also, note that Siebel System, Inc. was charged by the SEC twice, first in 2002 and then again in 2004. 
6 Siebel at 704. 
7 Disclosure regulations under the U.S. federal securities laws and Reg FD define information as material if “there is 
a substantial likelihood that the information would have been viewed by a reasonable investor as having significantly 
altered the total mix of information made available” based on the U.S. case laws, TSC Industries v. Northway Inc. 
(1976) and Basic, Inc. v. Levinson (1988). 
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effect on the behavior of capital market participants. In other words, did corporate officials view 
Siebel as limiting the enforcement scope of Reg FD and modify their disclosure behavior 
accordingly? We note that the market may have viewed the decision as aberrational or unlikely to 
cause the SEC to change its approach in enforcing Reg FD with the hope that in the future courts 
would support the SEC’s approach. 8  Thus, the effect of the Siebel decision on subsequent 
managers’ behavior is an empirical question. A significant increase in selective disclosure after 
the court’s ruling would suggest that the market viewed the decision as a significant impediment 
to the SEC’s enforcement policy going forward. The finding would also suggest that challenges 
associated with enforcing corporate disclosure regulations in the context of implicit 
communication can significantly limit the effectiveness of such regulations. 
We examine the change in managers’ selective disclosure behavior following the Siebel 
Systems decision by investigating the change in selective disclosure to financial analysts, given 
that managers’ use of implicit communication to convey non-public information privately to 
analysts was one of the stated concerns of the SEC (see, e.g., SEC 1999a, 2000). We follow 
Gintschel and Markov’s (2004) approach and examine changes in the information content of 
analyst information outputs after the court’s ruling. We use a sample of analyst earnings forecasts 
and stock recommendations issued from September 1, 2004, to August 31, 2006, the two-year 
period around the court’s ruling. We find that the effect on stock returns due to analyst information 
outputs (earnings forecasts and stock recommendations) is significantly greater in the one-year 
period after the court’s ruling than that in the one-year period before the court’s ruling, 7.6% versus 
5.3% absolute standardized stock returns. This result suggests that the court’s ruling led to a 
statistically and economically significant increase in firms’ selective disclosure to analysts.  
To mitigate the concern that the above results are due to an unspecified time trend, we 
perform a pseudo-event test (e.g., Kross and Suk 2012). We divide the sample period into three 
                                               
8 For example, Sherman and Sterling LLP noted in its Client Publication: “It remains to be seen whether the SEC will 
appeal the court’s decision and whether other courts will agree with what is essentially non-binding dicta in the court’s 
opinion that the close scrutiny brought to bear by the SEC finds no support in the regulation and will have the effect 
of impeding the broad flow of information to the public (Sherman and Sterling LLP, 2005, page 3).” 
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overlapping one-year sub-periods (Sept. 1, 2004 – Aug. 31, 2005; Mar. 1, 2005 – Feb. 28, 2006; 
and Sept. 1, 2005 – Aug. 31, 2006), and use March 1, 2005 and March 1, 2006 as pseudo-event 
dates for the first and third sub-period, respectively. For the pseudo-event dates, we do not observe 
a significant change in the information content of analyst information outputs. However, using the 
actual date of the court’s ruling, September 1, 2005, as the event date for the second sub-period, 
we find results similar to those observed for the full sample. This analysis helps us rule out the 
time trend explanation for our main results.  
To further mitigate the concern that our findings may be due to some other macro events 
during our two-year sample period, we examine changes in the information content of analyst 
information outputs over a much shorter sample period, specifically, two months around the 
court’s ruling. We find consistent results, showing a significant increase in the information content 
of analyst information outputs after the court’s ruling. This analysis further suggests that our main 
finding is likely to be driven by the court’s ruling.  
Next, we carry out a cross-sectional analysis for further identification of the reason behind 
our findings. Prior studies have shown that managers discriminate among analysts by granting 
better private information access to analysts who hold a more favorable view of their firm (e.g., 
Gintschel and Markov 2004; Chen and Matsumoto 2006). If the increase in the information content 
of analyst information outputs after the court’s ruling is indeed due to an increase in managers’ 
selective disclosure to the analysts, then this increase should be more pronounced if an analyst 
tends to hold a more favorable view of the firm. We show that, after the court’s ruling, the increase 
in the information content of analyst information outputs related to a firm is more pronounced for 
those analysts who tend to hold a more favorable view of the firm. Thus, this result further suggests 
that the increase in the information content of analyst information outputs after the court’s ruling 
is likely to be driven by the increase in selective disclosure by managers to analysts.  
Additionally, we use an alternative methodology to examine the effect of the court’s ruling 
on firms’ selective disclosure to analysts. We follow Mohanram and Sunder’s (2006) approach, 
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which is based on the notion that an increase in selective disclosure from managers to analysts 
would reduce the analyst’s workload per firm. They measure analyst workload using the average 
number of firms covered by an analyst as well as the average number of analysts following a firm. 
We find a significant increase in the average number of firms covered by an analyst and the average 
number of analysts following a firm in the one-year period after the court’s ruling relative to the 
one-year period before the ruling, and these effects are of similar order of magnitude as those 
documented by Mohanram and Sunder (2006). These results further suggest that analyst access to 
selective disclosure increased after the court’s ruling. 
 We note that the scope of our analysis is limited by the fact that the very nature of private 
meetings prevents us from directly documenting the nature of the information that was conveyed.9 
Even though we cannot provide direct evidence, our setting offers a unique opportunity to 
empirically examine the challenge of implicit communication to the effectiveness of enforcing 
corporate disclosure regulation.10 We infer that our results are due to officials’ increasing use of 
implicit communication in private meetings for the following reasons. First, both explicit and 
implicit communication made through public disclosures subject corporate officials to potential 
liability under Rule 10b-5. This liability can be enforced by private litigants through class actions 
in addition to SEC enforcement actions. Indeed, studies have found that corporate officials’ use of 
optimistic tone in public disclosures can subject them to increased litigation risk (Rogers, Van 
Buskirk, and Zechman 2011; Cazier, Merkley, and Treu 2019). In contrast, corporate officials are 
                                               
9 Currently, companies are not required to disclose publicly the discussions in their private meetings with analysts or 
investors (Soltes 2018). Soltes (2014), Solomon and Soltes (2015), and Park and Soltes (2018) overcome this data 
limitation to some extent by obtaining proprietary records of private meetings from one or two companies. They are 
able to address several interesting questions with that data. However, due to potential legal concerns with possessing 
records of management’s responses, they could not obtain permission to analyze information that was disclosed by 
management (cf. Park and Soltes, 2018).  
10 We note that prior studies on the effect of Reg FD also rely on indirect evidence. Studies that address whether Reg 
FD reduced private disclosure by firms of non-public information to analysts arrive at their conclusions by examining 
the change in the properties of analysts’ forecasts and analysts’ workload (Gintschel and Markov 2004; Mohanram 
and Sunder 2006; Kross and Suk 2012;). Studies that address the existence of private disclosures of non-public 
information under Reg FD by firms to analysts, also rely on indirect evidence. For example, Green, Jame, Markov, 
and Subasi (2014) examine whether access to management at broker-hosted investor conferences is associated with 
more informative research output by analysts.  
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unlikely to be subject to 10b-5 liability for statements made privately both because such disclosures 
are made to a limited audience, rendering them unsuitable for a class action lawsuit, and because 
a private claim would require proof by the plaintiffs that the private disclosures materially altered 
the total mix of information available, proof that would implicitly concede that the plaintiffs had 
received material non-public information. 11  Second, the Siebel opinion explicitly instructed 
corporate officials that, in evaluating their private disclosures, the courts would be focused on 
explicit statements and the extent to which those statements “add, contradict, or significantly alter 
the material information available to the general public.” Siebel thus allowed officials to infer that 
implicit communication would not be subject to a similarly exacting degree of judicial scrutiny.12 
To further examine the likelihood that our results are due to officials’ increasing use of 
implicit communication in private meetings, we report survey results from 60 lawyers (primarily 
law firm partners with more than 20 years of experience) about their perceptions of the reason for 
the effect we document around the court’s ruling. 13 We selected these lawyers based on their 
specific expertise in Reg FD. The results show that these lawyers perceive an increase in implicit 
communication to be a more likely explanation of the effect than an increase in explicit 
communication or any other reason.  
A contemporaneous study by Allee, Bushee, Kleppe, and Pierce (2019), concludes that 
Siebel decision increased selective disclosure by managers to other market participants, 
institutional investors, by showing an increase in informed trading by transient institutional 
investors after the decision. Their finding further supports the proposition that our finding of an 
increase in the informativeness of analysts output after the Siebel decision is unlikely to be due to 
                                               
11 If plaintiffs acknowledged receiving material non-public information and trading on that information, they would 
face potential liability for illegal insider trading. 
12 The change in management perceptions, as suggested by our results, is consistent with the change in the SEC’s 
behavior. After the Siebel Systems decision, SEC enforcement actions were confined to cases in which an issuer’s 
private statements were explicitly contrary to its public statements. Specifically, SEC brought six such enforcement 
actions in the years 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2013 (Bengtzen 2017). 
13 We assume that the effect the Siebel decision would have had on the behavior of managers would have been most 
likely through the information and advice they receive from their lawyers, who are likely to have paid much closer 
attention to Siebel decision than other market participants (Soltes 2018). 
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some other contemporaneous event. The two studies together suggest that Siebel decision resulted 
in an increase in selective disclosure by managers to both analysts and investors.14  
Our study makes the following important additional contributions. To the best of our 
knowledge, our study is the first to focus on the challenge of implicit communication to the 
effectiveness of enforcing a corporate disclosure regulation. The Siebel decision revealed the 
inherent difficulty associated with enforcing a disclosure regulation, specifically, Reg FD, when 
information can be conveyed through implicit communication. Our empirical and survey findings 
together suggest that private communication between management and analysts increased 
significantly after the Siebel decision, implying that the market participants believe that after 
Siebel the SEC would face greater difficulty enforcing Reg FD in the context of implicit 
communication, and that consequently the effectiveness of Reg FD significantly decreased 
following the decision.15  
Our findings also have implications for other corporate disclosure regulations such as federal 
securities laws that prohibit misrepresentation of material information and trading on insider 
information, such as Rule 10b-5. Specifically, managers may mislead investors not merely through 
explicit quantitative statements but also through qualitative statements and information conveyed 
through their tone and demeanor. Enforcement efforts directed to these actions may face similar 
challenges. Notably, although studies document that private plaintiffs tend to file securities fraud 
litigation based on optimistic qualitative public disclosures (see, e.g., Rogers et al. 2011; Cazier et 
                                               
14 Note that prior studies that examine the effects of Reg FD also tend to focus on the effect on just one type of market 
participant at a time. The findings of these studies then reinforce each other’s conclusions. For example, to document 
the effectiveness of Reg FD, a set of studies examined changes in financial analyst outputs (e.g., Arya, Glover, 
Mittendorf, and Narayanamoorthy 2005; Gintschel and Markov 2004; Irani and Karamanou 2003; Mohanram and 
Sunder 2006) whereas others investigated changes in equity investor behavior (e.g., Ke, Petroni, and Yu 2008; Li, 
Radhakrishnan, Shin, and Zhang 2011; Sinha and Gadarowski 2010). 
15  Several recent studies show that private communication with management remains an important source of 
information for analysts (see, e.g., Green et al. 2014; Solomon and Soltes 2015; Bushee, Gerakos, and Lee 2018; 
Campbell, Twedt, and Whipple 2020). These studies typically use sample periods that are post-2005. The significantly 
greater difficulty faced by SEC in enforcing Reg FD on implicit communication after the 2005 Siebel Systems decision 
could be an important factor driving the results of these studies.  
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al. 2019), courts may not find qualitative disclosures material.16 Corporate officials can further 
reduce the prospect of 10b-5 litigation by making optimistic statements in private rather than in 
public communication. Unlike Rule 10b-5, Reg FD cannot be enforced by private litigants. 
Because after Siebel decision the SEC would find it difficult to bring enforcement action against 
company officials making optimistic statements in private meetings, corporations and corporate 
officials may be less attentive to the risk of providing misleading information through implicit 
communication in such meetings.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses prior studies, describes Reg 
FD and the Siebel decision, and presents our empirical predictions. Section 3 and 4 present the 
main empirical analyses and additional analyses, respectively. Section 5 summarizes our survey 
approach and provides corresponding results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Related studies, Reg FD, Siebel decision, and empirical predictions  
2.1 Related studies 
Reg FD, which targets the selective disclosure of material information by corporations and 
corporate officials, typically in the context of private meetings or phone calls, has been the subject 
of extensive empirical study. Initial studies of its effect find that the regulation succeeded in 
significantly reducing selective disclosure of non-public information to analysts (see, e.g., 
Gintschel and Markov 2004; Mohanram and Sunder 2006; Wang 2007; Kross and Suk 2012). 
More recent studies show that private communication with management remains an important 
source of non-public information for analysts (see, e.g., Soltes 2014; Green et al. 2014; Solomon 
and Soltes 2015; Bushee et al. 2018; Campbell et al. 2020).  
Corporate officials can engage in selective disclosure through implicit communication as 
well as explicit quantitative statements. A growing body of literature shows that the use of implicit 
                                               
16 See, e.g. Hoffman (2006), who describes that such cases are frequently dismissed as un-actionable “puffery.”  
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communication in public disclosures affects capital market perception about firm value. Feldman 
et al. (2010) document that managers’ tone, i.e. the frequency of positive words and negative 
words, in MD&A is associated with excess market returns in the short window around SEC filings. 
Similarly, Loughran and McDonald (2011) show that the proportion of negative words in 10-K 
reports is associated with abnormal returns, abnormal trading volume, and return volatility. Davis, 
Piger, and Sedor (2012) document significant positive market response to earnings press releases 
containing net positive language, i.e. the difference between the percentage of positive words and 
the percentage of negative words. Also, net positive language predicts firms’ future performance. 
Mayew and Venkatachalam (2012a) document that even managers’ non-verbal cues convey value-
relevant information. They argue that managers’ vocal dissonance reflects managers’ emotional 
state and that managers’ positive and negative emotional states during the question and answer 
portion of earnings conference calls are associated with contemporaneous stock returns.  
The literature also documents that managers can strategically manipulate market perception 
through implicit communication. Davis and Tama-Sweet (2012) document that managers with 
stronger incentives to report strategically, e.g., managers who habitually meet or beat analysts’ 
forecasts, reduce the use of negative language in earnings press releases relative to the use in the 
corresponding MD&A. Huang, Teoh, and Zhang (2014) show that the language in earnings press 
releases is more positive (or negative) when firms have a stronger incentive to bias investor 
perceptions upward (or downward), e.g., at the time of equity offerings and merger and acquisition 
(or stock option grants). Notably, implicit communication in public disclosures subject 
corporations and corporate officials to potential liability for securities fraud under Rule 10b-5. 
Rule 10b-5 is subject to both private enforcement by the SEC and public enforcement through 
class action litigation. Rogers et al. (2011) and Cazier et al. (2019) show that firms with more 
positive language in earnings announcements are more likely to experience class action lawsuits 
when compared to other firms in the same industry. These studies thus document a potential 
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motivation for corporate officials to make optimistic statements in private rather than public 
communication, to avoid the prospect of 10b-5 litigation. 
Because these studies do not have access to private communication between managers and 
analysts, they cannot evaluate the role of implicit communication in that context. Private meetings 
present greater potential for the use of implicit communication in that meeting attendees can better 
observe a corporate official’s demeanor, tone and expression. Reg FD was specifically targeted at 
private communication between corporate managers and analysts. Interestingly, in its one-year 
special study evaluating the effectiveness of Reg FD, the SEC reported evidence indicating that 
issuer use of private meetings had declined substantially (SEC 2001). More recent academic 
studies document, however, that the use of such private communication continues to be widespread 
following the adoption of Reg FD. One recent study, Brown, Call, Clement, and Sharp (2019), 
report that 70 percent of firms grant investors private access to corporate officials. Studies also 
document that managers use those private meetings to convey subtle yet market-valuable 
information (Bengtzen 2017; Bushee et al. 2018; Campbell et al. 2020; Solomon and Soltes 2015). 
Our study documents the importance of the Siebel Systems case in enabling the use of such 
communication in private meetings to continue. 
 
2.2 Reg FD 
2.2.1 Adoption of Reg FD  
The SEC adopted Reg FD on August 10, 2000, with the goal of reducing information 
asymmetry in the market. The regulation was intended to respond to the Supreme Court’s decision 
in SEC. v. Dirks, which held that a research analyst who received material non-public information 
from a corporate insider was not liable for insider trading unless the insider’s tip constituted a 
breach of his fiduciary duty. The rule was highly controversial. Although many commentators 
believed the rule would level the playing field for small investors, others expressed concern that it 
would have a chilling effect on the flow of information from issuers to the market (Kobi 2002). 
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One reason for this concern was uncertainty about the applicable standard of materiality. As 
adopted, Reg FD prohibits selective disclosure of material information. The rule did not define 
materiality, however; instead it incorporated a fairly vague judicially-promulgated definition that 
has been extensively criticized. To assist firm in assessing materiality, the SEC provided detailed 
interpretive guidelines, which included identifying seven categories of information that “have a 
higher probability of being considered material” (see, e.g., SEC 1999a, 2000; Maco 2000; Walker 
2000).  
The task of evaluating materiality is complicated by the fact that issuers convey information 
through quantitative as well as qualitative statements, through the tone they use as well as the time 
they devote to discussing certain topics, and through implicit communication. Since the early years 
after the adoption of Reg FD, the SEC was of the view that managers could convey material 
information through implicit communication, and this view was reflected in compliance guidance 
provided by the SEC and its staff members. For example, Walker (2000) states that “the adopting 
release [of Reg FD] makes clear that selective disclosure of earnings information cannot come in 
the form of indirect guidance, the meaning of which is apparent though implied.” Thus, issuers 
who engaged in private communication with analysts and investors after the adoption of Reg FD 
had to determine the extent to which those meetings could be interpreted as conveying material 
non-public information. 
 
2.2.2 SEC Enforcement of Reg FD 
Following its adoption of Reg FD and prior to the U.S. federal district court’s ruling on SEC 
v. Siebel Systems, Inc. on September 1, 2005, the SEC brought six enforcement actions against 
firms for selectively disclosing non-public information (Bengtzen 2017). Two of these explicitly 
involved implicit forms of communication (Hanley 2003; Fisch 2013). First, in 2002, the SEC 
penalized Siebel Systems, Inc. and its CEO for selectively disclosing material non-public 
information using optimistic statements. Specifically, the SEC charged that during a public 
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earnings call on October 17, 2001, the CEO characterized the IT market as “soft” and stated that 
“things will be quite tough through the remainder of the year.” At an invitation-only technology 
conference on November 5, 2001, however, the CEO stated to nearly 200 attendees that “we are 
pretty optimistic about what we’re seeing at this time…we’re seeing a return to normal behavior 
in IT buying patterns,” without making a simultaneous public disclosure. The SEC deemed the 
selective disclosure to be material by noting that immediately afterwards, certain attendees at the 
conference purchased Siebel’s stock or communicated the CEO’s statements to others who 
purchased the stock. Moreover, on the day of the conference, the company’s stock price closed 
approximately 20% higher than the prior day’s close and the trading volume was more than twice 
the average daily volume.17 The SEC’s approach of determining materiality by looking at post-
disclosure investor actions is consistent with the standards expressed in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson 
(1988) – that information is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor 
would consider the information important in making an investment decision (Hanley 2003; SEC 
1999b). 
Second, in 2003, the SEC penalized Schering-Plough and its CEO for selectively disclosing 
negative material non-public information to financial analysts. Specifically, during the week of 
September 30, 2002, Schering-Plough’s CEO and senior vice president of investor relations met 
privately with analysts and portfolio managers of four investment companies. The SEC charged 
that at each of the meetings with the investment companies, “through a combination of spoken 
language, tone, emphasis, and demeanor,” Schering-Plough’s CEO disclosed negative material 
non-public information regarding the firm’s earnings prospects. Soon after the meetings, analysts 
at the investment companies downgraded Schering-Plough’s stock, and portfolio managers at the 
companies heavily sold the stock. The price of Schering-Plough’s stock declined over the next 
several days by more than 17 percent on approximately four times normal trading volume. Through 
                                               
17 See SEC v. Siebel Systems, Inc. (SEC 2002) for more details. The SEC’s complaint and administrative proceeding 
are available here: https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-46896.htm; 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr17860.htm.  
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this enforcement action against Schering-Plough and its officials, the SEC reinforced its view 
about the role that various forms of implicit communication can play in a Reg FD violation (Hanley 
2003).  
 
2.3 The Siebel Systems Case 
In April 2003, Thomas M. Siebel, Siebel’s CEO, made a series of public statements 
negatively characterizing the company’s performance in the first quarter of 2003 and its expected 
performance in the second quarter of 2003. On April 4, 2003, Siebel Systems warned that first-
quarter revenues would fall short of its forecast and attributed the shortfall to deals that did not 
close before the end of the quarter, i.e., the “deals that slipped.” During the earnings warning, the 
CEO stated that “there is clearly less business activity right now than there was three months ago.” 
On April 23, 2003, the company hosted an earnings call to discuss first quarter earnings and 
earnings guidance for the second quarter. In discussing the company’s first quarter performance, 
the CEO characterized the first quarter as a “tough quarter” and linked the company’s difficulties 
to the economy. The CEO further stated that certain deals “didn’t get signed…due to basically 
uncertainty and war and disease and everything that’s going on around the world that’s kind of 
yucky right now” and that “the economic situation is really very uncertain out there…we are not 
in expansive stage of the business cycle yet.”  
On April 28, 2003, the CEO made a public speech at a conference sponsored by Deutsche 
Bank. In that speech, the CEO reiterated how “tough” the market was and linked the company’s 
past and future performance to the general economic conditions. The CEO repeated his negative 
assessment of the economy: “With war, with famine, with disease, I mean it’s like the apocalypse 
out there.” When asked what the company was witnessing “in terms of activity levels now in April 
and the economy,” the CEO responded: “Well I read Business Week on the airplane and I see that 
they’ve extrapolated the downward trend in software to now boomerang and it’s all happy days 
are here again. We don’t see anything in the market to indicate that that’s true.” 
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On both April 23 and 28, 2003, the company provided guidance for the second quarter of the 
fiscal year 2003. It projected that its software license revenues would be in the range of $120 to 
$140 million, which was more than the company’s reported revenues for the first quarter. 
However, the company conditioned its estimate on the performance of the overall economy. It said 
that if the economy improved, the company’s business would improve, and that, conversely, if the 
economy did not improve, then the company’s business would not improve.   
On April 30, 2003, two officials at Siebel Systems, Inc., Kenneth A. Goldman, Siebel’s CFO, 
and Mark Hanson, a senior executive, attended two private meetings in New York, a one-on-one 
meeting with Alliance Capital Management and an invitation-only dinner hosted by Morgan 
Stanley. At these private meetings, Goldman made statements that, in the view of the SEC, more 
positively characterized the company’s business activity and sales pipeline.  
Specifically, during the one-on-one meeting with Alliance Capital Management, the CFO 
stated that the company’s business activity levels were “better,” that “new deals” were coming 
back into the pipeline, and that the pipeline was now “growing.” At the invitation-only dinner 
hosted by Morgan Stanley and stated that the company’s business activity levels were “good” and 
“better” and that its sales pipeline was “building.” The CFO’s disclosures were significantly more 
positive and upbeat than the company’s public disclosures. Unlike the company’s prior public 
disclosures about its prospective performance in the second quarter, CFO’s statements about the 
company’s business were not linked to or conditioned upon the performance of the economy. The 
attendees at the private meetings reacted either by promptly trading Siebel stock or disseminating 
the CFO’s statements to selected investors. Immediately following the CFO’s comments, two 
Alliance portfolio managers who attended the meeting placed orders to purchase 114,200 shares 
of the company’s stock. Prior to the meeting, the portfolio managers had not held the stock for 
approximately 12 months in the funds that they managed. Within 24 hours after the meeting, 
Alliance Capital Management’s net position on Siebel stock increased by 222,400 shares. At least 
two of the attendees at the Morgan Stanley dinner bought the company’s stock next morning and 
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Morgan Stanley disseminated the CFO’s positive statements to select investors. For example, a 
Morgan Stanley institutional sales trader called a client and said that the Morgan Stanley “analyst’s 
take” on the dinner was “the body language was positive…the pipeline is building and expected 
to grow,” and characterized the information as “positive data points.” Morgan Stanley also 
communicated the CFO’s positive comments by e-mail to hundreds of investors, many of whom 
bought Siebel stock on the morning of May 1, 2003. On May 1, the stock price closed roughly 8% 
higher than the prior day’s close. Trading volume on May 1 was nearly double the average daily 
volume for the preceding 12 months (See Figures 1 and 2). 
Following these events, the SEC initiated an enforcement action against Goldman, Hanson 
and Siebel Systems, alleging violations of Reg FD. Specifically, the SEC complaint alleged that 
Goldman’s private communications were “significantly more positive and upbeat” than the 
information the company had previously disclosed publicly. The defendants moved to dismiss, 
arguing that the statements made by Goldman in the private meetings were neither material nor 
nonpublic. On Sept. 1, 2005, the court granted the motion to dismiss, holding that “the statements 
relied upon in the complaint fail to support its conclusory allegation that material information 
disclosed by Mr. Goldman in private, had not already been publicly disclosed by Siebel Systems.”  
In reaching this conclusion, the Siebel court focused exclusively on the specific statements 
made by Goldman in the private meetings. In each case, the court concluded either that the private 
statements were not materially different from the company’s public statements or that the 
information contained in CFO’s comments could be inferred from quantitative information that 
was publicly disclosed during the company’s public announcements.  
For example, on April 23 and 28, 2003, the company publicly stated that “the company 
projected that its software license revenues would be in the range of $120 to $140 million”, which 
was more than the company’s reported revenues for the first quarter. The court argued that these 
public statements clearly disclosed that the company was projecting an increase in revenues in the 
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second quarter. Thus, the court claimed that based on the information, a reasonable investor would 
be aware that the sales pipeline was “growing” and “building.” 
The court also argued that the CFO’s private statement that the activity levels were “good” 
and “better” was based on information available to the public since the company had publicly 
reported that it anticipated a future increase in the company’s performance: the terms “good” and 
“better” are merely generalized descriptive labels based on the underlying quantitative information 
provided publicly by the company. Hence, the statements regarding the company’s performance 
or activity levels being “good” and “better” did not alter the total mix of information already 
available to the reasonable investor.  
The court also considered the subsequent trading activity by those in attendance at the private 
meetings, activity that the SEC argued was evidence that Goldman disclosed new material 
information. Although the court acknowledged that “[a] major factor in determining whether 
information is material is the importance attached to it by those who were exposed to the 
information as may be expressed by their reaction to the information,” it concluded that “The 
actions taken by those in attendance at Mr. Goldman's speaking engagements, although a relevant 
consideration, do not change the nature or content of Mr. Goldman's statements.” 
Significantly, although the court noted in a footnote that corporate officials could violate Reg 
FD through “Tacit communications, such as a wink, nod, or a thumbs up or down gesture,” the 
court limited its analysis in the case to the specific statements made by Goldman in private. The 
court observed that Reg FD does not require that the statements made by corporate officials 
privately match their public statements “verbatim”, observing that “To require a more demanding 
standard, in the context of Reg FD, could compel companies to discontinue any spontaneous 
communications so that the content of any intended communication may be examined by a 
lexicologist to ensure that the proposed statement discloses the exact information in the same form 
as was publicly disclosed.” Noting that “The SEC has scrutinized, at an extremely heightened 
level, every particular word used in the statement, including the tense of verbs and the general 
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syntax of each sentence,” the court held that “such an approach places an unreasonable burden on 
a company’s management and spokespersons to become linguistic experts, or otherwise live in 
fear of violating Reg FD.” It therefore granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. 
 
2.4 Enforcement of Reg FD on implicit communication – The Effect of SEC v. Siebel  
The Siebel court’s ruling revealed the difficulty of enforcing Reg FD. First, in the context of 
private meetings, there is typically no transcript or verbatim record of the information conveyed. 
Second, private meetings provide an opportunity for corporate officials to convey information both 
explicitly and implicitly through the use of more or less positive language, emphasis and non-
verbal cues. Third, Siebel conveyed to market participants the message that, even a significant 
stock price reaction or trading activity by select investors following a private meeting would not 
constitute proof that those investors had received material non-public information.  
Further, Siebel was a high-profile decision. It was the first litigated case involving the SEC’s 
enforcement of Reg FD. As a result, the court case generated national attention even in its 
preliminary stages (Page and Yang 2005). The Chamber of Commerce of the United States filed 
an amicus brief in support of the Siebel System Inc.’s motion to dismiss the civil lawsuit brought 
by the SEC.18 At the same time, a group of 24 securities law professors also filed amicus briefs in 
opposition to the motion to dismiss. Moreover, the U.S. federal district court’s ruling on SEC v. 
Siebel Systems, Inc. (2005) was the first judicial opinion on SEC’s enforcement actions under Reg 
FD and the court’s decision was promptly and widely publicized by major news media outlets.19 
Thus, the managers of U.S. firms would have quickly become aware of the ruling and its 
significance. 
Siebel’s effect on selective disclosure by corporate officials depended on the following 
factors. The market may have viewed the court’s ruling as likely to make it more difficult for the 
                                               
18 Available here: http://www.uschamber.com/nclc/caselist/briefsrtoz.htm. The Chamber and others argued that Reg 
FD was an unconstitutional restriction of free speech. See Norris (2005). 
19 Wall Street Journal (Solomon 2005), the New York Times (Labaton 2005), the Washington Post (Johnson 2005), 
and the Financial Times (Parker 2005) featured the ruling the next day. 
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SEC to bring enforcement actions in connection with implicit communication made through 
private meetings. Alternatively, the market may have viewed the decision as aberrational or 
unlikely to cause the SEC to change its approach in enforcing Reg FD. That is, the market may 
have expected the SEC to continue to enforce the regulation aggressively with the hope that in the 
future, courts would support the SEC’s approach (Sherman and Sterling LLP 2005). 
The above discussion suggests that the net effect of the court’s ruling on selective disclosure 
by firms is an empirical question. If we find a significant increase in selective disclosure after the 
court’s ruling, it would suggest that the market believed that the arguments put forward by the 
court were persuasive, and that the SEC would be unlikely to challenge the ruling successfully in 
the future. Such a finding would also suggest that the challenges associated with enforcing 
corporate disclosure regulations on implicit communication can significantly limit the 
effectiveness of the regulations. 
 
3. Empirical analyses 
3.1 Research design 
To address the effect on U.S. firms’ selective disclosure behavior due to the Siebel Systems 
decision, we examine changes in the flow of non-public information from managers to analysts, 
by following an approach that is similar to Gintschel and Markov (2004). Their study examines 
whether the flow of private information from managers to analysts decreases following the passage 
of Reg FD by estimating the change in the incremental absolute stock returns around analyst 
information outputs. As in Gintschel and Markov (2004), we consider the following two-step 
process: 
|RETURN|i,t = αt + βt ANALY_OUTi,t + ε                                                    (1) 
αt = a1 + a2 POST_RULINGt + e                                           (2) 
βt = b1 + b2 POST_RULINGt + e                                           (3) 
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where Equation (1) is a cross-sectional regression. It is run separately for each trading day in our 
two-year sample period. The dependent variable |RETURN|i,t is absolute standardized stock 
returns for firm i on date t. To control for cross-sectional variation in the stock price volatility 
across different firms, each individual firm’s time-series daily stock returns are standardized to a 
mean of zero and a standard deviation of one over the sample period. ANALY_OUTi,t equals to 
one for firm i on date t if at least one analyst earnings forecast or one stock recommendation exists 
for the firm around date t. If an analyst information output is announced within two calendar days 
following the firms’ public disclosures such as earnings announcements or management earnings 
forecasts, then these days are excluded from the definition of ANALY_OUTi,t, because it is not 
possible to determine the incremental effect of each of the events on stock returns (Gintschel and 
Markov 2004). 
To determine the window for measuring the information content of analyst information 
outputs, Gintschel and Markov (2004) examine stock market reactions on each of -10 to +5 days 
around analyst information outputs for their two-year sample period around the implementation of 
Reg FD in 2000. They find that absolute standardized stock returns are significantly positive for 
each of the -5, -4, -3, -2, -1, 0, and +1 days around analyst information output. Accordingly, they 
use [-5, +1] days window around each analyst information output to measure the information 
content of analyst information outputs. We carry out a similar analysis for the two-year sample 
period around the U.S. federal district court’s ruling on SEC v. Siebel Systems, Inc. (2005) on 
September 1, 2005. We find that the absolute standardized stock market reactions are significantly 
positive for each of the days -1, 0, and +1 around analyst information outputs. Thus, we use [-1, 
+1] days window around analyst information outputs to examine the change in the information 
content of analyst information outputs.20 
                                               
20 The three-day window has been commonly used in the literature (e.g., Francis and Soffer 1997; Lin and McNichols 
1998; and Park and Stice 2000). In any case, we show that our results are robust to using the [-5, +1] window.  
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In Equation (1), αt captures absolute standardized stock returns for firm-date observations 
without analyst information outputs. βt captures the incremental absolute standardized stock 
returns due to analyst information outputs. We regress 505 daily estimates of αt and βt on 
POST_RULING (Equation (2) and Equation (3), respectively). POST_RULING equals one if a 
trading day is after the U.S. federal district court’s ruling on SEC v. Siebel Systems, Inc. (2005) on 
September 1, 2005, and zero otherwise. Thus, the estimated coefficient on POST_RULING in 
Equation (2), i.e. a2, captures the average change in the absolute standardized stock returns for 
days without analyst information outputs. The estimated intercept in Equation (3), i.e. b1, captures 
the incremental absolute standardized stock returns due to analyst information outputs in the one-
year period before the court’s ruling. The estimated coefficient on POST_RULING in Equation 
(3), i.e. b2, captures the average change in the incremental absolute standardized stock returns due 
to analyst information outputs following the court’s ruling. If the flow of private information from 
managers to analysts increases after the court’s ruling, then we expect the estimated coefficient on 
POST_RULING in Equation (3) to be positive.21  
 
3.2 Data and sample 
Table 1 reports the sample selection procedure and descriptive statistics. The sample includes 
stocks issued by U.S. firms with analyst earnings forecasts and stock recommendations available 
from September 1, 2004, to August 31, 2006, in International Brokers’ Estimate System (IBES). 
Following Gintschel and Markov (2004), we require each stock to have at least one analyst 
earnings forecast and at least one stock recommendation in each of the one-year periods before 
and after the court’s ruling on September 1, 2005. We also require each stock to have a complete 
series of stock returns over the sample period, which includes 505 trading days, available in CRSP. 
We exclude stocks with missing data in Compustat for net sales, total assets, and market 
                                               
21 We repeat the analysis by combining Equation (1) and (2) into a single model using an interaction term and the 
results are similar. 
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capitalization, for the fiscal year 2003. Our final sample contains 3,172 stocks and 1,601,860 (= 
3,172 stocks x 505 trading days) daily stock returns observations. The mean (median) of absolute 
standardized stock returns, |RETURN|, is 0.707 (0.525). The mean value of ANALY_OUT is 
0.208 suggesting that 20.8% of the 1,601,860 firm-date observations in our final sample have at 
least one analyst earnings forecast or one stock recommendation within [-1, +1] days.  
 
3.3 Main results 
Table 2 reports results for the test of changes in the information content of analyst outputs 
after the court’s ruling. Panel A reports a change around the court’s ruling in the absolute 
standardized stock returns for firm-date observations without analyst information outputs. The 
estimated coefficient on POST_RULING is 0.018 (t-statistic = 1.37), indicating an insignificant 
change. Panel B reports a change due to the court’s ruling in the incremental absolute standardized 
stock returns for firm-date observations with analyst information outputs within [-1, +1] days. The 
estimated intercept is 0.053 (t=statistic = 12.53) suggesting that the absolute standardized stock 
returns are significantly greater on days with than without analyst information outputs in the period 
prior to the court ruling. The estimated coefficient on POST_RULING is 0.023 (t-statistic = 
3.80).It suggests that the stock market reaction to analyst information outputs increases to 0.076 
(= 0.053 + 0.023) aboslute standardized stock returns following the court ruling. These results 
suggest that the information content of analyst information outputs increased significantly after 
the court’s ruling on SEC v. Siebel Systems, Inc. (2005). This finding is consistent with managers 
significantly increasing selective disclosure to analysts after the court’s ruling. This change in 
managers’ disclosure behavior implies that the ruling revised market participants’ belief about the 
difficulty the SEC would face in the future enforcing the corporate disclosure regulation on implicit 
communication. 
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3.4 Pseudo-event tests 
To mitigate the concern that our results may be driven by a time trend, we perform a pseudo-
event test. We divide our two-year sample period into three partially-overlapping one-year sub-
periods: i) the first sub-period is from September 1, 2004 to August 31, 2005, and is entirely before 
the court’s ruling; ii) the second sub-period straddles the court’s ruling, and is from March 1, 2005 
to February 28, 2006; and iii) the third sub-period is from September 1, 2005 to August 31, 2006, 
and is entirely after the court’s ruling.  
Table 3, column 2, reports results for the second sub-period, using the actual date of the 
court’s ruling, i.e. September 1, 2005, as the event date. We find results that are similar to that of 
the full sample. In Panel A, the estimated coefficient on POST_RULING is 0.001 (t-statistic = 
0.06), indicating an insignificant change in the absolute standardized stock returns for firm-date 
observations without analyst information outputs. In Panel B, the estimated coefficient on 
POST_RULING is 0.024 (t-statistic = 2.86), suggesting a significant increase in the information 
content of analyst information outputs from the six-month period before to the six-month period 
after the court’s ruling. Columns 1 and 3 of Table 3 report results for the first and third sub-periods, 
using March 1, 2005, and March 1, 2006, as pseudo-event dates, respectively. The results show an 
insignificant change in the information content of analyst information outputs from the period 
before to the period after the pseudo-event dates. These results suggest that our main findings are 
unlikely to be driven by a time trend. 
 
3.5 Shorter sample periods 
The analysis in Table 2 is based on a two-year sample period, comprising of one year before 
and one year after the court’s ruling, and thus it is possible that unspecified macro events during 
that two-year sample period may be responsible for our results. To address this concern, we 
examine a shorter sample period, specifically, two months around the court’s ruling. Table 4, Panel 
A, reports a change after the court’s ruling in the absolute standardized stock returns for 
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observations without analyst information outputs. The estimated coefficient on POST_RULING 
is 0.006 (t-statistic = 0.019), indicating an insignificant change in the absolute standardized stock 
returns for firm-date observations without analyst information outputs. Panel B reports a change 
in the incremental absolute standardized stock returns for firm-date observations with analyst 
information outputs within [-1, +1] days. The estimated coefficient on POST_RULING is 0.080 
(t-statistic = 4.37), suggesting that after the court’s ruling, there was a significant increase in the 
absolute standardized stock returns due to analyst information outputs. These results mitigate the 
concern that some unspecified macro event 22  is responsible for the observed change in the 
information content of analyst output after the court’s ruling.23 
 
3.6 Cross-sectional test 
Gintschel and Markov (2004) argue that managers reward financial analysts who hold a more 
favorable view of their firms by granting them more access to private information. If the court’s 
ruling on SEC v. Siebel Systems, Inc. (2005) made it more difficult for the SEC to enforce Reg FD 
on managers’ selective disclosure through implicit communication, then more favorable analysts 
should benefit more from the increase in selective disclosure following the court’s ruling. We 
examine whether, after the court’s ruling, the increase in the information content of analyst 
information outputs is more pronounced for analysts with a more favorable view of the firm. For 
this test, we use the following regression models: 
|RETURN|i,t = αt + βt ANALY_OUTi,t + γt FAVORABLEi,t x ANALY_OUTi,t + ε        (4) 
αt = a1 + a2 POST_RULINGt + e                                                     (5) 
                                               
22  The New York Times provides a news archive that covers the two-month period around the court’s ruling:  
https://query.nytimes.com/search/sitesearch/#/*/from20050801to20050930/allresults/90/allauthors/oldest/Business/. 
We searched business news articles published in the New York Times during the two-month period around the court’s 
ruling. We reviewed 1,677 articles, one of which is Labaton (2005), which features the court’s ruling. We did not find 
any other event that can alternatively explain the change in the information content of analyst information outputs. 
23 We note that the information environment for research analysts was affected by the Research Analyst scandal and 
the subsequent Global Research Settlement (Fisch 2007). The scandal was initially revealed to the public through a 
press release by the NY State Attorney General in April 2002. The Global Research Settlement received court approval 
on Oct. 31, 2003. See https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18438.htm. Because the Settlement predates the start 
of our sample period, September 1, 2004, to August 31, 2006, by almost a year, the effect that we observe is more 
plausibly attributed to the Siebel decision, which occurred in the middle of our sample period. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3664289
 
 
25 
 
βt = b1 + b2 POST_RULINGt + e                                                     (6) 
γt = c1 + c2 POST_RULINGt + e                                                     (7) 
where FAVORABLEi,t equals one for firm i on date t if at least one earnings forecast or one stock 
recommendation issued by an analyst affiliated with a favorable brokerage firm, falls within [-1, 
+1] days around date t. A brokerage firm is defined as favorable on a firm-date if the average of 
analyst earnings forecasts or stock recommendations issued by the brokerage firm during the past 
six months is above the median of all brokerage firms that follow the firm. Equation (4) is 
estimated separately for each of the 505 trading days in our sample period. The coefficient βt 
captures the incremental absolute stock returns due to analyst information outputs, and the 
coefficient γt captures the additional effect for analysts belonging to a favorable brokerage firm. 
In Equations (5), (6), and (7), 505 estimates of αt, βt, and γt from Equation (4) are regressed on the 
variable POST_RULING, which equals one if the trading day is after the court’s ruling on 
September 1, 2005, and zero otherwise. The coefficient on POST_RULING in Equation (5) 
captures the change following the court’s ruling in the absolute standardized stock returns for firm-
dates without analyst information outputs. The coefficient on POST_RULING in Equation (6) 
captures the change following the court’s ruling in the incremental absolute standardized stock 
returns due to analyst information outputs issued by non-favorable analysts. The coefficient on 
POST_RULING in Equation (7) captures the change following the court’s ruling in the additional 
incremental absolute standardized stock returns due to analyst information outputs issued by 
favorable analysts as compared other analysts.  
In Table 5 Panel A, the estimated coefficient on POST_RULING is 0.018 (t-statistic = 1.37), 
indicating an insignificant change after the court’s ruling in the absolute standardized stock returns 
for firm-date observations without analyst information outputs. Panel B reports a change after the 
court’s ruling in the incremental absolute standardized stock returns due to analyst information 
outputs issued by non-favorable analysts. The coefficient on POST_RULING is 0.018 (t-statistic 
= 3.07), suggesting a significant increase in the information of analyst outputs issued by non-
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favorable analysts. Panel C reports the additional incremental absolute standardized stock returns 
due to analyst information outputs issued by favorable analysts as compared non-favorable 
analysts. Specifically, the estimated intercept c1, is 0.061 (t-statistic = 12.76), suggesting that the 
information content of analyst information outputs is greater for analysts affiliated with favorable 
brokerage firms than for analysts affiliated with non-favorable brokerage firms. This result is 
consistent with the evidence in the literature that managers discriminate among analysts by 
granting more private information access to analysts who hold a more favorable view of their firm 
(e.g., Gintschel and Markov 2004; Chen and Matsumoto 2006). Further, the estimated coefficient 
on POST_RULING is 0.012 (t-statistic = 1.77), suggesting that after the court’s ruling the increase 
in information content of analyst information outputs is greater for analysts from more favorable 
brokerage firms than for analysts from other brokerage firms. This finding suggests that more 
favorable analysts are bigger beneficiaries of the increase in managers’ selective disclosure 
behavior after the court’s ruling.24 This cross-sectional evidence helps further identify that after 
the court’s ruling, increase in information content of analyst information outputs is due to an 
increase in selective disclosure from managers to analysts.  
 
4. Additional analyses: Analysts’ workload per firm 
The preceding analysis uses the Gintschel and Markov (2004) methodology, which is based 
on the notion that the increase in managers’ selective disclosure through implicit communication 
to analysts would make analysts outputs more informative. We examine the sensitivity of our 
resulting conclusions using an alternative methodology. Mohanram and Sunder (2006) argue that 
when access to firms’ private information reduces, analysts have to spend greater effort on 
gathering and discovering information, and consequently analysts have to significantly decrease 
their coverage. To show the effectiveness of Reg FD in curbing selective disclosure by firms to 
analysts, Mohanram and Sunder (2006) show that the average number of firms covered by an 
                                               
24 This distinction becomes more meaningful in light of the Global Research Settlement, which led to more balanced 
recommendations (Fisch, 2007). 
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analyst and the average number of analysts following a firm decreased significantly after Reg FD. 
We follow Mohanram and Sunder’s approach, and to provide evidence for the change in selective 
disclosure behavior of firms due to the court’ ruling on SEC v. Siebel Systems, Inc. (2005), we 
examine its effect on analysts’ workload, measured as the average number of firms covered by an 
analyst and the average number of analysts following a firm.  
In Panel A of Table 7, we provide the sample selection procedure for this analysis. We restrict 
our sample to analysts that follow at least one U.S. firm in each of the one-year periods before and 
after the court’s ruling on September 1, 2005 (Mohanram and Sunder 2006). Our final sample 
includes 3,434 analysts. Panel B shows that following the court’s ruling, the average number of 
firms covered by an analyst increases by 0.84 (t-statistic = 4.53), from 10.30 firms to 11.14 firms, 
suggesting that analysts’ workload per firm decreased after the court’s ruling, presumably due to 
an increase in selective disclosure to analysts by managers. In Panel C, we provide the sample 
selection procedure for the sample examining a change in the average number of analysts following 
a firm, before versus after the court’s ruling. For this analysis, we restrict our sample to U.S. firms 
that are followed by at least one analyst in each of the one-year periods before and after the court’s 
ruling. Our final sample includes 4,588 firms. Panel D shows that the average number of analysts 
following a firm increases by 0.34 (t-statistic = 2.03), from 8.49 analysts to 8.83 analysts. These 
results further suggest that analysts’ workload per firm decreased following the court’s ruling, 
presumably due to an increase in selective disclosure from managers to analysts. Note that the 
effects reported in Table 7 are of similar order of magnitude to that observed by Mohanram and 
Sunder (2006) underscoring the economic significance of the effect of the court’s ruling on 
managers’ selective disclosure behavior.  
 
5. Survey  
One difficulty in our investigation is that private communication between managers and 
investors/analysts is unobservable. In order to peer into this black box in relation to our research 
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questions, we need the perspective of professionals who understand the legal implications of Reg 
FD, the Siebel Systems case, and managers’ interactions with investors and analysts. Therefore, to 
further investigate the reason for the effect that we document in the previous sections, we survey 
lawyers with expertise in Reg FD about the reasons that they perceive to be driving the effect. 
These securities lawyers are uniquely positioned to provide this perspective because they 
understand the implications of the law and also inform and advise managers in securities law 
compliance.  
 
5.1 Participants and survey distribution 
We compile a hand-collected database of contact information for securities lawyers with 
relevant expertise by searching the internet for law firm memos written about Reg FD and 
recording the names and email addresses of the memos’ authors. Our final pool of potential survey 
respondents totals 307 lawyers from 74 different law firms.  
To distribute the survey, we email out a Qualtrics survey link to potential participants 
followed by a reminder email one week later. We open the survey on 6/22/2020 and close it on 
7/20/2020. We receive a total of 76 completed responses for a response rate of 24.8 percent, which 
is higher than similar surveys of experienced professionals conducted via email such as the survey 
of investor relations officers (IROs) by Brown et al. (2019) with a response rate of 14.5 percent 
and the survey of chief financial officers (CFOs) by Dichev, Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2013) 
with a response rate of 5.4 percent.  
Of the 76 completed responses, 16 participants fail one or both initial screening questions 
and therefore complete the survey without answering any additional questions. As shown in Table 
8 Panels A and B, the 75 percent of participants identify as a law firm partner and 82 percent report 
more than 20 years of experience.  
 
 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3664289
 
 
29 
 
5.2 Survey questions 
The survey consists of two screening questions (referenced previously) followed by the main 
survey question, which has five parts, and then two questions about participants’ experience 
practicing law, which are displayed in Table 8 Panels A and B.25 The two screening questions 
allow the lawyers to self-report their (1) Reg FD-related experience and (2) familiarity with the 
SEC v. Siebel Systems, Inc. case. Both are yes-no questions and a ‘no’ response to either question 
results in the termination of the survey without the opportunity to respond to any additional 
questions.  
To ensure clear understanding, the survey next differentiates between two sets of terms: (a) 
implicit and explicit communication and (b) public and private disclosure settings. Then, after 
explaining the existence of the effect we observe in our archival analyses, the question asks 
participants to rate the likelihood of five potential explanations (which are shown in random order) 
on a 5-pt scale with scale points ranging from 0 = ‘Not at all likely’ to 4 = ‘Extremely likely.’ 
Figure 3 displays this main research question.  
The five explanations that participants rate in the main survey question are different possible 
explanations for the results we observe in our archival analyses in sections 3 and 4 of this paper. 
The effect could be occurring because managers engaged in more explicit or more implicit 
communication post-Siebel and managers might be doing this intentionally or unintentionally. Or, 
the results could be driven by another reason entirely. Each of these possible explanations is shown 
in Figure 3.  
 
5.3 Survey results 
Table 8 Panel C displays the results to the main survey question. Survey participants’ 
responses indicate the most likely explanation for the effect is that managers unintentionally 
increased implicit communication in private meetings with analysts after the SEC v. Siebel 
                                               
25 We received and incorporated feedback from three law firm partners before administering the survey. 
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Systems, Inc. (2005) court case ruling. This explanation is rated by the lawyers as significantly 
more likely than any other explanation. Further, both types (unintentional and intentional) of 
increases in implicit communication are rated as significantly more likely than increases in either 
type (intentional or unintentional) of explicit communication. These results, from highly 
experienced professionals uniquely qualified to weigh in on the subject, support the conclusion 
that managers’ increases in implicit communication are most likely responsible for the increases 
in information content of analyst reports post-Siebel. 
The survey results further suggest that the lawyers consider an increase in unintentional 
implicit communication to be a significantly more likely explanation than an increase in intentional 
implicit communication for the effect. This finding is consistent with the notion that managers may 
not intend to violate Reg FD in private meetings, but that, after the Siebel decision, they may have 
become less concerned about the possibility of communicating non-public information through 
implicit communication, since the court ruled that SEC’s approach of monitoring implicit 
communication places an “unreasonable burden” on managers.26 Our survey results also suggest 
that the lawyers did not rule out an increase in intentional implicit communication as a possible 
explanation for the increase in information content of analyst reports post-Siebel. This finding is 
consistent with the notion that the court ruling may have also signaled to the market participants 
that circumstantial evidence such as a significant stock price reaction or trading activity by select 
investors following a private meeting may not be sufficient proof that management intentionaly 
disclosed material non-public information. Thus, the ruling could also have increased managers’ 
incentives to take chances and intentionally make selective disclosures through their tone or body 
language, if they perceive potential benefits from doing so, such as better relations with important 
analysts and less price volaitlity (Allee et al. 2019). 
 
 
                                               
26 This explanation was also echoed in our interviews of three securities lawyers who have expertise in Reg FD.  
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6. Conclusion 
This study examines the effectiveness of enforcing a corporate disclosure regulation when 
information is communicated in an implicit as well as explicit manner. In a unique federal court 
case, SEC v. Siebel Systems, Inc. (2005), the court took a literal approach in determining when a 
corporate official engaged in selective disclosure and thereby violated Reg FD. The court focused 
on a close reading of the text of the official’s statements rather than the official’s tone and 
demeanor to conclude that his private disclosures were equivalent in substance to the information 
publicly disclosed by the company. We posit that the market viewed the Siebel decision as a signal 
that the SEC could not effectively enforce Reg FD against corporate officials who privately 
communicated information through positive or negative language, tone, and non-verbal cues. As 
a result, the Siebel decision opened the door for officials to convey information selectively through 
implicit communication. Using a variety of tests, we provide evidence consistent with conclusion 
that the court’s ruling led to a statistically and economically significant increase in managers’ 
selective disclosure to financial analysts. Our results from the survey of lawyers suggest that the 
most likely explanation for the effect of the Siebel decision is increase in managers’ implicit 
communication. By documenting the effect of the Siebel decision on the behavior of market 
participants and on the effectiveness of the disclosure regulation, our study sheds light on the 
challenges associated with regulatory enforcement of a disclosure regulation, when information is 
conveyed in an implicit manner. 
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Appendix: Variable definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
 
|RETURN| 
 
Absolute standardized stock returns. Each individual firm’s time-series 
daily stock returns are standardized to a mean of zero and a standard 
deviation of one over the sample period to control for cross-sectional 
variation in the stock price volatility across different firms (Gintschel 
and Markov, 2004). 
 
ANALY_OUT Indicator variable that equals one if a trading day is within [-1, +1] days 
around at least one analyst earnings forecast or one stock 
recommendation, and zero otherwise. 
 
POST_RULING Indicator variable that equals to one if a trading day is after the U.S. 
federal district court’s ruling on SEC v. Siebel Systems, Inc (2005) on 
September 1, 2005, and zero otherwise. 
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Figure 1 
Siebel’s stock price movements around private meetings on April 30 
 
 
Figure 2 
Siebel’s trading volume movements around private meetings on April 30 
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Figure 3 
Main survey question 
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Table 1  
Sample selection and summary statistics 
 
Panel A: Sample selection 
Filter Number of Obs. Data Source 
 
U.S. stocks with at least one stock recommendation or 
analyst earnings forecast from 9/1/2004 to 8/31/2005 
and from 9/1/2005 to 8/31/2006, the one-year period 
before and the one-year period after the court’s ruling 
on 9/1/2005, respectively. 
3,910 IBES 
 
Stocks with complete stock return series during the 
sample period from 9/1/2004 to 8/31/2006 (505 trading 
days). 
 
3,358 CRSP 
Stocks with non-missing and non-negative sales, assets, 
and market capitalization at the beginning of the fiscal 
year 2004. 
3,172 Compustat 
The final sample includes 1,601,860 observations: 3,172 stocks x 505 trading days 
 
 
Panel B: Summary statistics 
 N Mean 
25th 
percentile 
Median 
75th 
percentile 
Std. dev. 
|RETURN| 1,601,860 0.707 0.232 0.525 0.968 0.706 
ANALY_OUT 1,601,860 0.208 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.406 
POST_RULING 505 0.499 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.500 
 
 
Panel A reports the sample selection procedure. The sample period is from September 1, 2004, to August 31, 
2006, the two-year period around the U.S. federal district court’s ruling on SEC v. Siebel Systems, Inc (2005) 
on September 1, 2005. Panel B reports summary statistics. Variable definitions are in the Appendix.  
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Table 2  
Effect of the court’s ruling on the information content of analyst information outputs 
 
|RETURN|i,t = αt + βt ANALY_OUTi,t + εi,t                                                          (1) 
αt = a1 + a2 POST_RULINGt + e                                                       (2) 
βt = b1 + b2 POST_RULINGt + e                                                      (3) 
 
Panel A: Absolute returns on days without analyst information outputs 
Dependent Variable: αt Coefficient t-statistic 
a1: Before the court’s ruling 0.684*** 73.17 
a2: Change following the court’s ruling 0.018*** 1.37 
Adj-R2 0.0017 
Number of observations 505 
 
Panel B: Incremental absolute returns due to analyst information outputs 
Dependent Variable: βt Coefficient t-statistic 
b1: Before the court’s ruling 0.053*** 12.53 
b2: Change following the court’s ruling 0.023*** 3.80 
Adj-R2 0.0260 
Number of Observations 505 
 
This table reports changes in the information content of analyst information outputs following the U.S. federal 
district court’s ruling on SEC v. Siebel Systems, Inc. (2005) on September 1, 2005. In Equation (1), the 
dependent variable |RETURN|i,t is absolute standardized stock returns for firm i on date t. To control for 
cross-sectional variation in the stock price volatility across different firms, each individual firm’s time-series 
daily stock returns are standardized to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one over the sample period. 
ANALY_OUT is an indicator variable that equals one if a trading day is within [-1,+1] days of at least one 
analyst earnings forecast or one stock recommendation, and zero otherwise. The estimated daily intercepts 
and coefficients from Equation (1) are regressed on the indicator variable POST_RULING that equals one if 
a trading day is after the U.S. federal district court’s ruling on 9/1/2005, and zero otherwise. The coefficient 
on POST_RULING in Equation (2), i.e. a2, captures the change after the court’s ruling in absolute 
standardized stock returns for days without analyst information outputs. The coefficient on POST_RULING 
in Equation (3), i.e. b2, captures the change after the court’s ruling in the information content of analyst 
information outputs. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 3  
Effect of the court’s ruling on the information content of analyst information outputs: Pseudo-event test 
 
Panel A: Absolute returns on days without analyst information outputs  
 
First One-Year Period 
9/1/04 – 8/31/05 
(1) 
Middle One-Year Period 
3/1/05 – 2/28/06 
(2) 
Last One-Year Period 
9/1/05 – 8/31/06 
(3) 
 Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
 
a1: Before the court’s ruling 0.691*** 60.88 0.679*** 56.29 0.680*** 45.06 
a2: Change following the court’s ruling -0.012*** -0.75 0.001*** 0.06 0.045*** 2.12 
Adj-R2 -0.0017 -0.0040 0.0137 
Number of Observations 253 252 252 
 
Panel B: Incremental absolute returns due to analyst information outputs 
 
First One-Year Period: 
9/1/04 – 8/31/05 
(1) 
Middle One-Year Period: 
3/1/05 – 2/28/06 
(2) 
Last One-Year Period: 
9/1/05 – 8/31/06 
(3) 
 Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
 
b1: Before the court’s ruling 0.051*** 9.19 0.055*** 9.23 0.079*** 12.13 
b2: Change following the court’s ruling 0.004*** 0.49 0.024*** 2.86 -0.007*** -0.74 
Adj-R2 -0.0030 0.0278 -0.0018 
Number of Observations 253 252 252 
 
In this table, we break the full sample period into three overlapping one-year sub-periods: 9/1/2004-8/31/2005, 3/1/2005-2/28/2006, and 9/1/2005-8/31/2006. For 
the first (third) sub-period, the pseudo-event date is 3/1/2005 (3/1/2006). For the second sub-period, the event date is 9/1/2005, which is the actual date of the U.S. 
federal district court’s ruling on SEC v. Siebel Systems, Inc. (2005). ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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Table 4  
Effect of the court’s ruling on the information content of analyst information outputs: Short 
sample period 
 
Panel A: Absolute returns on days without analyst information outputs  
Dependent Variable: αt Coefficient t-statistic 
a1: Before the court’s ruling 0.640*** 27.62 
a2: Change following the court’s ruling 0.006*** 0.19 
Adj-R2 -0.0229 
Number of Observations 44 
 
Panel B: Incremental absolute returns due to analyst information outputs 
Dependent Variable: βt Coefficient t-statistic 
b1: Before the court’s ruling 0.044*** 3.42 
b2: Change following the court’s ruling 0.080*** 4.37 
Adj-R2 0.2957 
Number of Observations 44 
 
In this table, we repeat the analysis in Table 2 after replacing the two-year sample period with a two-month 
sample period around the U.S. federal district court’s ruling on SEC v. Siebel Systems, Inc. (2005) on 
September 1, 2005. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 5  
Cross-sectional test: Favorable vs. non-favorable analysts 
 
|RETURN|i,t = αt + βt ANALY_OUTi,t + γt ANALY_OUTit x FAVORABLEi,t + ε                (4) 
αt = a1 + a2 POST_RULINGt + e                                                              (5) 
βt = b1 + b2 POST_RULINGt + e                                                              (6) 
γt = c1 + c2 POST_RULINGt + e                                                              (7) 
 
Panel A: Absolute returns on days without analyst information outputs  
Dependent Variable: αt Coefficient t-statistic 
a1: Before the court’s ruling 0.684*** 73.17 
a2: Change following the court’s ruling 0.018*** 1.37 
Adj-R2 0.0017 
Number of Observations 505 
 
Panel B: Incremental absolute returns due to non-favorable analyst information outputs 
Dependent Variable: βt Coefficient t-statistic 
b1: Before the court’s ruling 0.029*** 6.89 
b2: Change following the court’s ruling 0.018*** 3.07 
Adj-R2 0.0165 
Number of Observations 505 
 
Panel C: The effect of favorable analysts 
Dependent Variable: γt Coefficient t-statistic 
c1: Before the court’s ruling 0.061*** 12.76 
c2: Change following the court’s ruling 0.012*** 1.77 
Adj-R2 0.0042 
Number of Observations 505 
 
This table reports the effect of the court’s ruling on SEC v. Siebel Systems, Inc. (2005) on the information 
content of information outputs of analysts who are favorable versus non-favorable to the firm. In Equation 
(4), the dependent variable |RETURN|i,t is the natural log of absolute standardized stock returns for firm i on 
date t. ANALY_OUT is an indicator variable that equals one if a trading day is within [-1,+1] days of at least 
one analyst earnings forecast or one stock recommendation, and zero otherwise. FAVORABLE is an 
indicator variable that equals to one if a trading day is within [-1,+1] days of at least one analyst earnings 
forecast or one stock recommendation issued by an analyst who is affiliated with a more favorable brokerage 
firm, and zero otherwise. A brokerage firm is defined as favorable on a firm-date if the average of analyst 
earnings forecasts or stock recommendations issued by the brokerage firm during the past 180 days is above 
the median of all brokerage firms following the firm. In Equations (5), (6), and (7), 505 observations of αt, 
βt, and γt estimates from Equation (4) are regressed on the indicator variable POST_RULING that equals one 
if a trading day is following the court’s ruling on 9/1/2005, and zero otherwise. The coefficient on 
POST_RULING in Equation (6), i.e. b2, captures the change after the court’s ruling on the incremental 
information content of information outputs issued by analysts affiliated with non-favorable brokerage firms. 
The coefficient on POST_RULING in Equation (7), i.e. c2, captures the change after the court’s ruling on the 
additional incremental information content of analyst information outputs issued by analysts affiliated with 
favorable as against non-favorable brokerage firms. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 
0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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Table 6  
Robustness test: Alternate windows for measuring information content  
 
Panel A: Absolute returns on days without analyst information outputs -- [-5, +1] window 
Dependent Variable: αt Coefficient t-statistic 
a1: Before the court’s ruling 0.690*** 73.91 
a2: Change following the court’s ruling 0.016*** 1.19 
Adj-R2 0.0008 
Number of Observations 505 
 
Panel B: Incremental absolute returns due to analyst information outputs -- [-5, +1] window 
Dependent Variable: βt Coefficient t-statistic 
b1: Before the court’s ruling 0.016*** 3.93 
b2: Change following the court’s ruling 0.021*** 3.60 
Adj-R2 0.0232 
Number of Observations 505 
 
Panel C: Absolute returns on days without analyst information outputs -- [0, 0] window 
Dependent Variable: αt Coefficient t-statistic 
a1: Before the court’s ruling 0.685*** 73.29 
a2: Change following the court’s ruling 0.020*** 1.50 
Adj-R2 0.0025 
Number of Observations 505 
 
Panel D: Incremental absolute returns due to analyst information outputs -- [0, 0] window 
Dependent Variable: βt Coefficient t-statistic 
b1: Before the court’s ruling 0.111*** 21.06 
b2: Change following the court’s ruling 0.026*** 3.49 
Adj-R2 0.0217 
Number of Observations 505 
 
 
In this table, we report results using alternate windows for measuring the information content of analyst 
information outputs. We repeat the analysis in Table 2 after replacing the [-1, +1] window with [-5, +1] and 
[0, 0], respectively. [-5, +1] window is consistent with that in Gintschel and Markov (2004). ***, ** and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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Table 7  
Additional test: Effect of the court’s ruling on analysts’ workload  
 
Panel A: Sample selection for the sample examining the number of firms covered by an analyst 
Filter Number of Obs. Data Source 
Analysts who issued at least one EPS forecast for U.S. 
firms from 9/1/2004 to 8/31/2005, the one-year period 
prior to the court’s ruling on 9/1/2005. 
4,402 Analysts IBES 
Analysts who also issued at least one EPS forecast for 
U.S. firms from 9/1/2005 to 8/31/2006, the one-year 
period following the court’s ruling on 9/1/2005. 
3,434 Analysts IBES 
 
Panel B: Number of firms covered by an analyst before and after the court’s ruling 
 Pre Post 
H0: Pre = Post 
 
Mean 10.297 11.135  (t-statistic = 4.53) 
 
 
Panel C: Sample Selection for the sample examining the number of analysts covering a firm 
Filter Number of Obs. Data Source 
U.S. firms that have at least one EPS forecast available 
from 9/1/2004 to 8/31/2005, the one-year period prior 
to the court’s ruling on 9/1/2005. 
5,084 Firms IBES 
U.S. firms that also have at least one EPS forecast 
available firms from 9/1/2005 to 8/31/2006, the one-
year period following to the court’s ruling on 9/1/2005. 
4,588 Firms IBES 
 
Panel D: Number of analysts covering a firm before and after the court’s ruling 
 
 Pre Post 
H0: Pre = Post 
 
Mean 8.488 8.831 (t-statistic = 2.03) 
 
This table presents the change in analysts’ workload as reflected by the number of firms covered by an analyst 
and the number of analysts covering a firm. Panel A reports the sample selection procedure for the sample 
examining the number of firms covered by an analyst. Panel B reports the average number of firms covered 
by an analyst in the period before and in the period after the U.S. federal district court’s ruling on SEC v. 
Siebel Systems, Inc. (2005). Panel C reports the sample selection procedure for the sample examining the 
number of analysts covering a firm. Panel D reports the average number of analysts covering a firm in the 
period before and in the period after the court’s ruling. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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Table 8 
Survey results 
Panel A: Job titles of survey participants 
Job Title 
Percent of 
Participants 
 Partner/Law Firm Partner/Managing Partner 75.0 
Counsel/Of Counsel/Senior Counsel 11.7 
Other/Blank 13.3 
 
Panel B: Survey participants’ years of law practice 
Years of Law Practice 
Percent of 
Participants 
More than 20 years 81.7 
Between 15 and 20 years 8.3 
Between 10 and 15 years 6.7 
Between 5 and 10 years 1.7 
Less than 5 years 1.7 
 
Panel C: Main survey question results 
Explanation 
Average (SD) 
likelihood rating 
Significantly greater 
than 
(1) Unintentional increase in implicit communication  1.4 2-5 
(2) Intentional increase in implicit communication  0.9 3-4 
(3) Unintentional increase in explicit communication 0.8 4 
(4) Intentional increase in explicit communication 0.5 - 
(5) Another explanation 0.7 - 
 
Column 1 reports the average likelihood ratings on 5-pt scales ranging from 0 = “Not at all likely” to 4 = 
“Extremely likely” for five explanations of the effect documented in sections 3 and 4 of this paper. Column 
2 reports the results of pairwise t-tests testing the null hypothesis that the average likelihood ratings are 
equivalent for each set of two explanations. We report the explanations for which a given explanation is 
significantly greater than another explanation at the 10% level using the Bonferroni-Holm method to adjust 
for multiple comparisons. 
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